The potential impacts of data integrity attacks on multi-settlement electricity markets have been recently investigated and have sent a strong message to power grids independent system operators (ISOs) that adversaries could launch profitable cyber attacks by casting an incorrect image of transmission lines congestion pattern. However, these cautionary messages may be underestimated due to the adversaries unrealistic requirements (e.g. having access to real-time measurements) to launch a successful stealthy and profitable attack. This study examines the potential of the aforementioned risk by demonstrating how a malicious power market participant could disturb the electricity market operation, using a pre-designed false data injection attack along with bogus electricity trades in both day-ahead and real-time markets. The proposed attack design is robust against market uncertainties and the adversary can guarantee the success of the attack in advance. Hence, the existence of such cyber attacks against electricity markets can make the adversaries more aggressive. The numerical results on the IEEE 14-bus test system confirm the vulnerability of multi-settlement electricity markets to such financial cyber attacks. The results obtained from investigating such an attack design can be employed by ISOs in order to provide appropriate countermeasures.
Nomenclature

I
index for generation bus i J index for load bus j K index for bilateral contract k L index for transmission line l N total number of grid buses I total number of generation buses J total number of load buses K total number of bilateral contracts L total number of transmission lines M total number of sensors deployed in the grid P g i generation at bus i during the run time P d j load at bus j during the run time P b k bilateral contract k during the run time 
Introduction
Security and efficient operation of smart grids is highly dependent on the accuracy of measurements collected by meters installed throughout the network. Independent system operators (ISOs) use the received measurements as inputs for the state estimators to estimate unknown state variables. Then, the estimated variables are used by ISO to control power grid components and to organise the electricity market operation by providing appropriate control commands and financial signals, respectively. Therefore, the data integrity and the state estimation accuracy require utmost attention in order to guarantee a secure and efficient operation of modern grids.
Cyber attacks against grid's data integrity were initially considered as a specific kind of bad data which could be detected efficiently using a wide variety of existing bad data detection methods. However, it was shown in [1] that an adversary, leveraging sufficient knowledge of the grid configuration, can compromise certain meter measurements to launch a data integrity attack called false data injection attack while circumventing the existing bad data detection techniques. This finding triggered an intensive amount of efforts dedicated to study such attacks in different areas such as identifying the vulnerable regions of the system [2] , the impacts of such attacks on the grid stability [3] and designing countermeasure strategies against false data injection attacks [4, 5] . Most of the aforementioned researches have been devoted to investigate and prevent the physical consequences of cyber attacks. However, since in most real-time markets, locational marginal prices (LMPs) are calculated using the grid's present operating conditions obtained based on the state estimation output, the data integrity attacks can be launched to disturb electricity market by an adversary that aims at making a profit at the expense of social welfare deterioration [6] .
Most wholesale electricity markets consist of two settlement markets: day-ahead market and real-time market. The principles and structure of such electricity markets have been elaborated in [7] . Also, the fundamental features of Pennsylvania, New-Jersey, Maryland (PJM) market, as one of the major wholesale regional electricity markets in the world, has been outlined in [8] . In most multi-settlement electricity markets, both day-ahead and the realtime (balancing) markets are cleared based on the LMPs at different nodes. It has been shown in [8] that, under normal operational condition of the power grids, economic incentives designed in market structures lead to the convergence of the electricity prices in both markets.
Since the real-time prices are calculated based on the actual system operating condition which itself requires a state estimation, an adversary could launch a false data injection attack to manipulate the real-time prices and make profit from the differences between two market prices. Recently, the impacts of cyber attacks on the multi-settlement market have been studied in the literature. In [9] , a convex optimisation framework has been proposed to launch a false data injection attack in which the attacker, playing the role of a virtual bidder, attempts to mislead the state estimator in capturing the congestion pattern of the grid. Therefore, due to the wrong estimation of the congested lines, the real-time prices change in a way that the attacker's total revenue (obtained based on virtual electricity trades) becomes positive. Although the attack design suggested in [9] ensures that the attacker does not lose money, in many cases the launched attack will lead to a zero profit which makes the proposed design too risky. It should be noted that considering the virtual bid as the leverage to launch the false data injection attack simplifies the attack design complexity since the virtual bidding is applied after day-ahead market clearing, so it has no effect on the congestion pattern and the price of electricity in the day-ahead market. Also, due to the debating impacts of virtual bidding on markets (e.g. [10] ), this type of transaction is not allowed in most wholesale electricity markets.
Jia et al. in [11] introduced a new strategy to launch the false data injection attack against electricity market operation. In the suggested design, the adversary, as a generation unit, tries to maximise the real-time LMP at the bus the unit is located by manipulating some measurements. Also, in the framework proposed in [11] , the adversary has no control over real-time generations, and therefore may lose money if the results of realtime dispatch indicate a decrease in the generation of the adversary generation unit compared with the day-ahead market. The relationship between the data integrity attack and the real-time market was studied in [12] , in which Tan et al. proposed an optimisation framework to maximise the profit made from the designed attack. Although the proposed approach does not require access to the topology and the parameters of the network, the realtime data streams of meter measurements are essential to launch the proposed data integrity attack. Finally, Esmalifalak et al. in [13] suggested a possible attack design in which the inferred structural information of the grid is estimated through phasor observations and by applying linear-independent component analysis. In the next step, the adversary exploits the inferred structural information to launch a profitable stealthy attack in the real-time electricity market. In contrast with the attack suggested in [9] , the data integrity attacks designed in [11] [12] [13] are based on the analysis of real-time measurements; however, gaining access to such critical measurements in real time could be the main challenge to initiate such data integrity attacks.
Although the aforementioned efforts have given insightful information to the grid operators about the possibility of cyber attacks against the electricity market operations, these threatening remarks may be underestimated due to non-realistic conditions considered in the design of such attacks. In this paper, a data integrity attack is proposed which relaxes impractical conditions required to launch a successful attack in the literature. The main feature of the proposed attack is that it is robust against load uncertainties in both day-ahead and real-time markets; in other words, the adversary could be sure about her attack success in the day-ahead market, when she submits her bogus bilateral bids. Also, most data integrity designs in the literature [9, [11] [12] [13] [14] require accessing to the real-time measurements which could be a strong assumption in real applications. However, the proposed data integrity attack design relaxes this strong assumption, and it only uses the historical load data to construct a profitable false data injection attack. Finally, in contrast with the attacks proposed in the literature, the adversary uses both day-ahead and real-time markets to maximise the impacts of the launching attack and to increase the adversary flexibility to launch her malicious attack under different operating conditions. To achieve this, the adversary, who is also a participant in the electricity markets with bilateral contract, submits pre-designed bogus bilateral contracts on both markets and manipulates accessible measurements in real-time market to make a profit from submitted contracts. Owing to the robustness of the proposed design, the adversary can ensure the profitability due to the launched attack and its upper bound before the day-ahead market by checking the proposed criteria.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents preliminaries and outlines the multi-settlement market operation. Section 3 demonstrates the proposed profitable robust attack design using false data injection and bogus bilateral contracts. The numerical results on the test system are presented in Section 4 and finally Section 5 concludes this paper and provides direction for the future studies.
Preliminaries
Most of the deregulated electricity markets such as PJM as the world's largest wholesale electricity market consist of a forward market (day-ahead market) and a real-time balancing market. Both the forward and the balancing markets use the concept of LMP, as the by-product of the security-constrained economic dispatches, to calculate the settlement prices for all market participants. In this section, first, the structures of these two markets and the electricity pricing calculation are reviewed. Then, it is shown how the state estimations are employed in real-time markets to calculate LMPs based on the actual system operating conditions. Throughout this paper, the notation shown in the 'Nomenclature section' is used to present the parameters and the variables of the electricity markets. Also, the variables related to the day-ahead market are presented with star superscript to differentiate them from the variables of the real-time market. Finally, the estimated value of the state x obtained by state estimation is denoted by x.
Day-ahead energy market
Day-ahead market is a forward market that provides opportunities for the electricity market participants to sell and buy at every hour of the next operating day. Load serving entities and all generators with installed capacity contract submit their hourly demands and offer schedules into the day-ahead market, respectively. Also, the market participants with bilateral contracts submit their contracts to be considered as transmission users in the process of day-ahead dispatch optimisation [8] . Then, regional transmission organisation) as the electricity market regulator solves the economic dispatch problem considering generators and lines capacity limits. The day-ahead security-constrained economic dispatch can be formulated as
subject to ∑
where H is the distribution factor matrix that maps the nodal power injection vector to the power flows through transmission lines [15] . The solution to the above economic dispatch problem is used as the hourly generation schedules for the next operating day. Then, LMPs are calculated at different buses to determine the electricity price in the day-ahead market. LMP is defined as the cost of supplying an additional MW of load at a particular location which for bus i is calculated as
where λ ⋆ , η l ⋆ and ζ l ⋆ are the multipliers of the Lagrangian of the above-optimisation problem corresponding to the power balance equation, line flows upper and lower bound inequality constraints, respectively. Finally, the results obtained from the above least-cost dispatch are selected as the final day-ahead hourly schedules and the calculated LMPs are used as binding day-ahead price at each node to settle financial commitments to the market participants.
Real-time energy market
Real-time market is the balancing market employed in the wholesale electricity markets to correct the deviation from the dayahead market, caused by the grid uncertainties, and to calculate electricity prices and manage transmission congestion based on the real-time LMPs. There are two main approaches to bind financial commitment in real time: ex-ante and ex-post. In ex-post model, the generation scheduling is determined at ex-ante market, while LMP calculation is performed after the cycle of the spot market using an incremental dispatch model and based on the real-time operation condition of the system [16] . Therefore, the state estimation has to be performed to obtain real-time nodal prices.
State estimation:
The main idea behind the ex-post model is that due to the system uncertainties (i.e. uncertainties in loads), the states of the system are different from the values obtained in ex-ante market. Therefore, it is essential to obtain accurate estimation of the desired states of the system to calculate LMPs. In this paper, the vector of nodal power injection is considered as the system states x. Also, it is assumed that M = N + L sensors have been installed throughout the grid to measure the net power injection at each node and the power flows in the lines (in one direction). Given the linear relationships between the measurements and states in the DC model of power systems, the state-observation equation can be written as
where e is a Gaussian noise with zero mean and covariance matrix R and I N is the N × N identity matrix. Given the measurements observation z, it can be shown that the maximum-likelihood state estimate is obtained as
To detect bad measurements, it is assumed that the state estimator is equipped with the so-called residue detector where the residual r is defined as
The bad data detector δ alarm triggers when the 2-norm of the residual r becomes greater than a threshold τ. The bad data detector δ can be represented as
in which selecting τ is a challenging task. Quite often an upper bound on the probability of triggering false alarm is used to calculate the value of τ.
Ex-ante real-time market:
The ex-ante market is a leastcost security dispatch which is carried out 10-15 min prior to real time to correct generation scheduling P g ⋆ based on the projected system conditions within the next several minutes. Therefore, the ex-ante economic dispatch can be formulated as follows:
Then, the solution to the above security-constrained optimisation is sent to all market participants as the dispatch order.
Ex-post real-time market:
Owing to the presence of uncertainties in demands and unexpected outages (e.g. generators), the system real-time operation condition may differ from the exante dispatch results. Ex-post market calculates LMPs based on the actual response of the market participants to ex-ante dispatch (which had been done several minutes earlier) while considering the system current outages and congested transmission lines obtained by the state estimator [8] . In this paper, the ex-post pricing model is utilised that was first introduced in [16] and used later in [9] for the purpose of the electricity pricing. The first step to calculate LMPs is to determine the sets of positive and negative congested lines, C − and C + , based on the run-time estimations of lines power flows as follows:
Given the sets of the congested lines obtained based on the state estimation solution, following incremental linear programming problem is solved to obtain the LMPs for all buses:
By solving the above linear optimisation problem and obtaining Lagrangian multipliers, the real-time LMP is calculated as
where λ, η l and ζ l are the multipliers of the Lagrangian of the above-incremental linear programming corresponding to the power balance equation, line flows upper and lower bound inequality constraints, respectively. The obtained LMPs are then used to settle real-time market between participants.
Proposed robust attack design-
Designing attacks against electricity markets has been investigated in [9, 11] , in which an adversary tries to make a profit from market transactions by manipulating some meters data in ex-post real-time market. Owing to the issues mentioned in Section 1, the proposed attacks against electricity markets seem to be impractical. In this section, a new cyber attack design is proposed to show the vulnerability of current electricity market structure when a market participant has access to a few number of meters to launch her malicious false data injection attack. Unlike the method proposed in [9] that attacker is just a virtual bidder, in our proposed attack design, the attacker is one of the market participants who has a bilateral contract to deliver a certain amount of power, e.g. from bus s to bus d. The transmission congestion charge for such a transaction is equal to selling that amount of power at bus s and buying the same amount of power at bus d. For this market participant as an attacker, following capabilities are assumed:
• The adversary has enough knowledge about the probability distribution or at least the range of variations of load demands in both day-ahead market and real-time market.
• The attacker either already has a complete knowledge of the grid parameters and configuration or would acquire them [17, 18] .
• The attacker has no access to real-time measurements; however, she is able to manipulate some of the meters data or add some false data to the measurement vector.
It is assumed that there is a convergence between electricity prices in both markets (day-ahead and real-time markets) due to an economic incentive that has been designed in the market mechanism [8] .
The main idea behind the attack proposed in this paper is to make a difference between the day-ahead market and the real-time prices by changing the congestion patterns of the grid in two market windows. It is assumed that the attacker has access to a specific set of measurements to launch the proposed profitable attack. We define Λ as an M × M diagonal binary matrix, in which Λ ii is 1 if the ith sensor is one of the accessible measurements and 0 otherwise. Let us define a as the attack vector which lies in the column space of Λ; therefore, the manipulated measurement received by ISO can be represented as Z a = Z + a and the residue of state estimation in the presence of the false data injection can be written as
On the basis of (10), the attack will be harder to detect by a bad data detector as ∥ (I − CK)a ∥ 2 becomes smaller. The adversary defines an attack so that ∥ (I − CK)a ∥ 2 ≤ ϵ, where ϵ is the design parameter that should be selected by attacker based on her knowledge of the system and by making a trade-off between detectability and effectiveness of the launched attack. In the proposed attack design, the attacker tries to change the congestion status of one line in real-time market; therefore, she has to maximise the error in estimation of power flows through that line caused by her false data injection. To achieve this, the adversary solves the following optimisation problem for line l to calculate how much she can manipulate the estimation power flows through that line
It should be noted that adversary may solve the above-optimisation problem only for lines close to accessible sensors, since the effect of the attack on the estimation of line flows that are far from the accessible sensors is negligible. Owing to the stochastic nature of demands in electricity markets, the adversary cannot obtain the exact values for load demands to use in her attack design calculations. However, based on the historical data and by using load forecasting approaches, the adversary can obtain the ranges of uncertainties for loads in all nodes. In the next step, given the load uncertainties, the adversary has to calculate the ranges of powers flowing through the lines when the economic dispatch problem presented by (1) is solved. Although the interval optimisation (as suggested in [19] ) can be used to obtain a range of lines power flow variations given the loads uncertainties, the results obtained by following this approach are too conservative which reduces the attack possibility and effectiveness discussed later. However, since this calculation can be done off-line before the beginning of day-ahead market, the adversary can exploit a Monte Carlo simulation (MCS-based) approach to obtain the lines power flow expectation ranges. All the attacker needs in order to run MCS is reliable probability distributions of the loads at different nodes of the grid. Hence, the adversary generates appropriate samples given the loads distribution functions and solves the optimisation problem defined in (1) and saves the lines power flows for all the samples. Finally, using the obtained lines power flows, the adversary finds the ranges of variations for all the lines power flows. Fig. 1 illustrates the details of the proposed MCS.
Using the results of the proposed MCS, the lines power flows in the day-ahead market (F l ⋆ ) and real-time markets (F l ) can be given as
where [F l low , F l up ] is the line l power flow range of variation due to the load uncertainties. The obtained ranges become narrower as the adversary obtains more accurate prediction of the loads. Let us now consider that the adversary as a congestion customer has a bilateral contract P b to deliver power from the bus i to bus j and wants to make a profit by changing some measurements in the real-time market. To launch the proposed robust attack, the adversary implements the following steps to guarantee the success of her attack:
i. Given a set of measurements that the adversary can manipulate, the optimisation problem (11) is solved for all the selected lines. The obtained optimal values of the objective functions are considered as adversary budgets to change the estimation of lines power flows ΔF l a . ii. The proposed MCS is solved to obtain the ranges of the lines power flows (as the result of solving the economic dispatch problem) due to the load demand uncertainties. iii. The proposed robust attack is called successful if
Satisfying the above condition guarantees that there is at least one line that the attacker can change its estimated congestion status in real-time market, by manipulating the controlled set of sensors. In the nutshell, (13) presents a sufficient condition for a successful attack against power market operation. Therefore, the adversary performs MCS at every hour ahead of the day-ahead market. Whenever, she finds a line l t satisfying the above condition, she selects that line as the target line and launches the proposed attack by following next steps. From now on, we only investigate steps to launch a successful attack when the first condition in (13) is satisfied. Launching the proposed attack for the other three conditions are similar and hence are not discussed here. iv. Considering that the first condition in (13) is satisfied, the attacker submits the following bogus contract to the day-ahead market as the transmission lines customer:
where P bi j act is the actual bilateral contract and P bi j a is the attack component of the bilateral contract that is added by the adversary to launch the proposed profitable attack. Finally, P bi j ⋆ is the bogus bilateral contract submitted to the day-ahead market by adversary. Since the adversary aims to make a profit from the differences between LMPs of the day-ahead and realtime markets, the added attack part of the contract must not lead to changes in the lines congestion status even for the worst-case scenarios. Hence, the attack component of the bilateral contract is constrained as
The constraint (15) makes sure that the added bogus contract will not cause congestion in the target line l t during the dayahead market's security-constrained economic dispatch. Also, the inequality (15) ensures that the attack component of the bilateral contract makes the target line closer to congestion in day-ahead market, which is a necessary condition for the attack profitability, as shown later. In the nutshell, the adversary manipulates her day-ahead bilateral contract to make the target line closer to congestion as much as possible but not congested. Therefore, the adversary's resulting financial settlement is
Therefore, the adversary's financial settlement due to the added attack bilateral contract is
v. In the ex-ante market, in the hour that the adversary submits the bogus bilateral contract, the attacker updates her bilateral contract to the actual value as P bi j = P bi j act and submits the updated bilateral contract to the market. vi. In the ex-post real-time market, the attacker launches the proposed false data injection by adding an attack vector a l t [obtained beforehand by solving (11) for target line] to her accessible sensor measurements. Therefore, the state estimation receives the manipulated measurements as
Hence, the estimation of the target lines power flow will be F l t a = F l t + ΔF l t . Considering (12) and (13), it can be concluded that
The adversary's financial settlement after real-time market clearing is then calculated as
In practise, P bi j is given by specific meters, different from those used for the state estimation [11] , and hence P bi j is consistent with its actual real-time value P bi j act . Therefore, by substituting (14) into (20), it can be concluded that
Considering the convergence between the day-ahead and real-time market prices, we have
Given the fact that η l t , which is the Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to the power flow upper bound inequality constraint for line l t , is positive [9] , and considering the inequality condition (15), the second term of F s a in (22) is always positive. Therefore, the proposed attack is definitely profitable and the adversary revenue caused by the proposed attack can be calculated as
Following the aforediscussed steps, the adversary can design a profitable data integrity attack against power market operation. The design steps to launch the proposed attack are summarised and shown in Fig. 2 . Given above description, the designed attack has some major features as summarised below:
• The proposed attack design is robust in the sense that the launched attack will be profitable if the conditions in (13) are satisfied by performing steps 1-3. Hence, at every hour, the adversary checks the lines power flow ranges to see if they satisfy the conditions given in (13) and then initiates the attack when there is at least one transmission line satisfying (13).
• On the basis of (13) and (15), increasing load uncertainties decreases the possibility of launching a successful attack. It also decreases the maximum revenue Rev max that the adversary can achieve by launching the proposed attack. Therefore, it is critical for the adversary to make the uncertainty bounds as tight as possible.
• Finally, the adversary does not need to have access to real-time measurements to launch the proposed malicious attack.
Numerical results and discussion
In this section, we present numerical simulation results to examine the potential and effectiveness of the proposed robust attack design.
To study the economic impacts of the proposed attack, it is launched and evaluated on IEEE 14-bus and 39-bus systems. The MATPOWER package is used to retrieve the test system parameters and to perform the proposed MCS. Furthermore CVX, a software package used to define and solve convex programmes [20] , is employed to solve the adversary budget optimisation, dayahead (1) and real-time market dispatch problems (7) and (8) . It is assumed that one power flow sensor is installed on every bus and transmission line to measure the injected power and lines power flow, respectively. In the first scenario, the proposed attack design is implemented on the IEEE 14-bus test system shown in Fig. 3 , it is assumed that the adversary as an electricity market participant has a bilateral contract to deliver 20 MW from bus number 4 to bus number 3. Also, since the adversary is a market participant, she has enough resources to manipulate some measurements located close to the buses she sends and delivers the bilateral contracts.
In the first step, the adversary solves the optimisation problem introduced in (11) to evaluate her attack budget in order to change the estimations of lines power flows while the attack remains feasible. Fig. 4 shows the maximum errors in estimation of the transmission lines that the attacker can cause by launching the proposed false data injection attack for three cases. In case 1, the attacker has access only to sensor measurements at bus 3; in the second case, the adversary can manipulate sensors at bus 3 and line 3-4; and finally in the third case, the meters at buses 3, 4 and line 3-4 can be compromised by the adversary. The descriptions of the aforementioned attack cases are summarised in Table 1 . As it can be clearly observed from Fig. 4 , the attacker's ability to manipulate the power flow estimations in neighbourhood regions increases as the number of accessible meters increases. Also, given a set of accessible measurements by the adversary, the adversary power is maximum when she decides to manipulate the estimation of the power flow in line 6 located between bus numbers 3 and 4.
In the next step, the adversary performs the proposed MCS for each hour and waits for the hour that the MCS output satisfies the successful attack criterion given by (13) . Table 2 shows the transmission lines power flow bounds obtained by MCS for a specific hour considering ±2.5% uncertainty ranges for all the grid loads. Using the adversary budget shown in Fig. 4 , MCS results presented in Table 2 along with checking condition (13) , it is concluded that the adversary can certainly launch a successful attack in real-time market by manipulating accessible meters to compromise the estimation of the power flow of line 6 (between bus 3 and bus 4), so that ISO includes this line in the set of positive congested lines l 6 ∈ C + . Then, using (14) and (15), adversary obtains the maximum attack component value P bi j a as 7.75 MW that does not make line 6 congested in the day-ahead market. Therefore, she submits the bogus bilateral contract to transfer 27.75 MW power from bus number 4 to bus number 3 in the dayahead market. On the basis of the day-ahead market solution obtained by ISO, the adversary has to pay the following charge due to the attack component of her bogus bilateral contract:
In the ex-ante market, the adversary submits only the actual bilateral contract P bi j act based on the aforementioned instruction and waits for the real-time market in order to initiate her false data injection attack. In the real-time market, the adversary adds the optimal attack vectors obtained by solving the first set of optimisation problem to cause maximum error in the estimation of the power flow in the target line (l 6 ). The original, the manipulated and the limits of the lines' power flows for real-time operation of the grid are shown in Fig. 5 . This figure confirms that the attacker successfully misleads the state estimator in detecting the congested line set. On the basis of the real-time prices obtained by solving the optimisation problem (8), the attacker charge will be
Hence the adversary makes 10.24 $/h + 6.49 $/h = 16.73 $/h by launching the proposed robust false data injection attack which confirms the profitability of the scheme.
In the next step, the impact of the load uncertainties on the adversary's maximum profits is investigated when the adversary employs the proposed attack. To achieve this, the proposed robust data integrity attack against electricity market is launched while it is assumed that the adversary has different levels of knowledge about the load demands, and also she has a limited number of accessible sensors to manipulate. The simulation results for three aforedescribed cases of adversary's accessible sensors are shown in Table 3 . As illustrated in this table, increasing the adversary's prediction uncertainties decreases the possibility of launching the proposed cyber attack and maximum value of the attack component of the bogus bilateral contract. Although increasing the number of accessible sensors may allow the adversary to launch a successful attack even in the case with a high level of uncertainties, it cannot help the attacker to increase the attack component maximum value.
Finally, to show the scalability of the proposed robust attack design, it is implemented on the IEEE 39-bus test system shown in Fig. 6 . It is assumed that the adversary has an original bilateral contract to deliver 70 MW from bus number 2 to bus number 3 and is able to manipulate the active power measurements at buses 2 and 3 and lines 2-3, 3-4 and 3-18 in real time. Using the proposed attack design steps, the adversary submits the bogus bilateral contract of 94 MW power from bus number 2 to bus number 3 in day-ahead market and the original bilateral contract in ex-ante market. Finally, the adversary adds the calculated optimal attack vector to measurement vector in the real-time market, to change the status of the congestion in line 2-3. Fig. 7 shows line 2-3 power flow in the day-ahead market and the operator's estimation of power flow in this line in real-time market for 100 different load scenarios. As it is shown in this figure, in all of these cases, the line 2-3 congestion status is changed in the real-time market as the adversary desired to make profit from her bogus transaction. This figure confirms that the proposed data integrity attack is robust against the load uncertainty and it could be scaled up by the adversaries to be implemented in larger power grids.
Conclusion and future work
This paper investigates how a malicious adversary can compromise some sensor data to make a profit from a bogus bilateral contract in multi-settlement electricity markets. A robust strategy is proposed that enables the attacker to use a false data injection attack along with a bogus bilateral contract to make an unfair profit from the LMP differences between the day-ahead and real-time markets. Compared to the previous related research, the proposed attack design is more realistic since the impractical assumptions such as accessibility to the adversary's real-time measurements have been relaxed. Furthermore, the proposed attack design guarantees the profitability of the launched attack in advance, which could be considered as a motivation for adversaries to employ such design. The proposed design is robust against the adversary's uncertain knowledge of state estimation behaviour. Finally, the impact of demand uncertainties on the possibility of launching an attack and its maximum profit is investigated. As demonstrated in this paper, the potential of launching the proposed data integrity attack against the market operations must not be neglected. Therefore, we plan to investigate the applications of graph theoretic and machine learning tools as the countermeasures to detect such financial attacks against electricity markets. 
